WP 2018-382 by Giustinelli, Pamela & Shapiro, Matthew D.
  
 
   
 
   
  
  
 
M INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH • SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER MICHIGAN RETIREMENT RESEARCH CENTER UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN Working PaperWP 2018-382
SeaTE: Subjective ex ante Treatment Effect 
of Health on Retirement
Pamela Giustinelli and Matthew D. Shapiro
Project #: R-UM17-06
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
   
      
  
 
   
   
    
  
   
    
    
  
 
SeaTE: Subjective ex ante Treatment Effect of Health on Retirement 
Pamela Giustinelli
Bocconi University, IGIER, and LEAP
Matthew D. Shapiro
University of Michigan and NBER
February 2018
Michigan Retirement Research Center
University of Michigan
P.O. Box 1248
Ann Arbor, MI 48104
www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu
(734) 615-0422
Acknowledgements
The research reported herein was performed pursuant to a grant from the U.S. Social Security
Administration (SSA) funded as part of the Retirement Research Consortium through the University of
Michigan Retirement Research Center Award RRC08098401-09. The opinions and conclusions expressed 
are solely those of the author(s) and do not represent the opinions or policy of SSA or any agency of the
federal government, Bocconi University, or the Vanguard Group Inc. Neither the United States
government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, 
or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the 
contents of this report. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process or service by trade 
name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply endorsement,
recommendation or favoring by the United States government or any agency thereof.
Regents of the University of Michigan
Michael J. Behm, Grand Blanc; Mark J. Bernstein, Ann Arbor; Shauna Ryder Diggs, Grosse Pointe; Denise Ilitch,
Bingham Farms; Andrea Fischer Newman, Ann Arbor; Andrew C. Richner, Grosse Pointe Park; Ron Weiser, Ann 
Arbor; Katherine E. White, Ann Arbor; Mark S. Schlissel, ex officio
   
 
  
   
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
   
   
  
 
  
 
  
   
   
 
  
      
   
  
    
  
    
  
   
   
 
   
 
     
     
    
   
 
 
 
SeaTE: Subjective ex ante Treatment Effect of Health on Retirement
Abstract
This paper develops an innovative approach to measuring the effect of health on retirement. The
approach elicits subjective probabilities of working at specified time horizons fixing health level.
Using a treatment-effect framework, within-individual differences in elicited probabilities of
working given health yield individual-level estimates of the causal effect of health (the 
treatment) on working (the outcome). We call this effect the Subjective ex ante Treatment Effect
(SeaTE). The paper then develops a dynamic programming framework for the SeaTE. This
framework allows measurement of individual-level value functions that map directly into the
dynamic programming model commonly used in structural microeconometric analysis of
retirement. The paper analyzes conditional probabilities elicited in the Vanguard Research
Initiative (VRI)—a survey of older Americans with positive assets. Among workers 58 and 
older, a shift from high to low health would on average reduce the odds of working by 28.5 
percentage points at a two-year horizon and 25.7 percentage points at a four-year horizon. There
is substantial variability across individuals around these average SeaTEs, so there is substantial
heterogeneity in taste for work or returns to work. This heterogeneity would be normally
unobservable and hard to disentangle from other determinants of retirement in data on realized 
labor supply decisions and health states. The paper’s approach can overcome the problem that
estimates of the effect of health on labor supply based on behavioral (realizations) data can easily
overstate the effect of health on retirement whenever less healthy workers tend to retire earlier
for reasons other than health.
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“I was thinking about my health, the way things are going in the economy, I don’t know if it’s 
going to really pick up [...] There might be a chance of me working and there might be a chance 
that there won’t be much work when I’m that age. If I’m in good health [...] Well, I have no 
retirement, so if I am working, it’s going to have to be later than 65 if my health is good where I 
can work.” (57 years old working man explaining his answer to a question asking the percent 
chance that he will be working past age 62.) 
How does a treatment, such as poor health, affect a behavior, such as retirement?  In behavioral 
data, by which we mean realized outcomes or decisions of economic agents, the econometrician 
observes only the behavior conditional on the treatment, but not the counterfactual behavior 
absent the treatment. When there is unobserved heterogeneity across individuals, this inherent 
feature of behavioral data makes difficult inferences about causal effects. Rather than relying on 
behavioral data, the paper uses subjective expectations of a behavior or outcomes conditional on 
values of the treatment to elicit ex ante treatment effects.  This strategy allows each individual to 
be both treatment and control, thereby obviating the unobserved counterfactual problem and 
allowing for unrestricted heterogeneity across individuals. This approach yields an individual-
level estimate of the treatment effect that we call the Subjective ex ante Treatment Effect, or 
SeaTE for short. Thus, this paper provides a strategy for quantifying person-specific treatment 
effects and for characterizing the distribution of causal effects across the population.  
We implement our approach by asking older workers participating in the Vanguard Research 
Initiative (VRI) to report the conditional likelihood, on a 0-100 percent chance scale that they 
will be working to specified horizons under alternative health scenarios. They also report their 
unconditional likelihoods of working to those horizons and of experiencing those health states. 
Using these data we generate individual and aggregate level estimates of the Subjective ex ante
Treatment Effect (SeaTE) of health on retirement age, given by the difference between 
respondents’ likelihoods of working in low versus high health. We interpret the SeaTE in a 
dynamic programming framework, and estimate a simple structural econometric model of health 
and retirement combining the conditional probability measures with this theoretical framework. 
The Subjective ex ante Treatment Effect (SeaTE) of health on retirement is zero for almost 
30% of working respondents aged 57 and higher at both 2 and 4 year horizons. The remaining 
70% reports have a strictly negative SeaTE (median of -40% and standard deviation of 24% 
percent for the 2-year horizon; median of -30% and standard deviation of 25% percent for the 4-
year horizon). The structural model implies that moving from high to low health has a large, 
negative effect on the mean value of continued work, but the within-person correlation of this 
value across states is high. 
  
 
 
 
Literature on Health and Labor Supply. The determinants of retirement have been widely 
studied in economics and elsewhere (e.g., see recent reviews by Coile (2015), Fisher et al. 
(2016), and French and Jones (2017)). The role of health has been subject to much debate due to 
the difficulties of unpacking the health-work nexus.  
First, the sign of the relationship is theoretically ambiguous. Health might operate through a 
variety of mechanisms such as preferences, productivity, financial incentives, horizon, 
expectations (e.g., see Rust and Phelan (1997), Blau and Gilleskie (2008), van der Klaauw and 
Wolpin (2008), Bound et al. (2010), French (2005), French and Jones (2011), and Garcia-Gomez 
et al. (2017)), and in several forms such as expected trajectory vs. unexpected shocks, earlier vs. 
later changes, types of conditions (e.g., see Grossman (1972), Bound et al. (1999), Lumsdaine 
and Mitchell (1999), McGarry (2004), and Blundell et al. (2016)). 
Second, the magnitude of the relationship is hard to quantify empirically as health and work 
are jointly determined and tend to feed dynamically into each other. This has prompted 
researchers to investigate the potential effect of retirement on health (e.g., see Rohwedder and 
Willis (2010), Coe and Zamarro (2011), and Behncke (2012)).  
Finally, both retirement and health are subject to several measurement issues which 
exacerbate the challenges of studying their relationship (e.g., see Bound (1991), Dwyer and 
Mitchell (1999), Lindeboom and Kerkhofs (2009), and Kapteyn and Meijer (2014) on health 
measurement, and Gustman et al. (1995, 2010) and Maestas (2010) on concepts and measures of 
retirement).
Literature on Subjective Expectations. Since the early 1990s economists have increasingly 
measured individuals’ subjective expectations in surveys, using a 0-100 scale of percent chance. 
This endeavor was stimulated by the importance of subjective expectations in economic models 
of lifecycle behavior (e.g., Hamermesh (1985) builds the case for measurement of perceived 
horizons or longevity expectations) and by earlier empirical evidence and theoretical arguments 
demonstrating the greater informativeness of elicited probabilities for binary events over more 
commonly used “yes/no” intention measures (see Juster (1966) and Manski (1990)).  
Manski (2004, 2017), Attanasio (2009), Hurd (2009), van der Klaauw (2012), Armantier et
al. (2013), Delavande (2014), Schotter and Trevino (2014), Carroll (2017), and Giustinelli and 
Manski (2018) trace the development of the subjective expectations literature from various 
perspectives. Manski (2004) provides an historical account and discusses the main issues arising 
when measuring expectations. Hurd (2009) focuses on measurement and analyses of 
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expectations of older Americans in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). Attanasio (2009) 
and Delavande (2014) deal with measurement and analysis of subjective expectations in 
developing countries. van der Klaauw (2012) discusses use of expectations data in structural 
models of intertemporal choice. Schotter and Trevino (2014) extend the discussion to decision-
making under uncertainty by experimental subjects in the lab and Giustinelli and Manski (2018) 
to family processes of human capital investment and schooling decisions. Armantier et al. (2013) 
deal with inflation expectations and, more generally, Manski (2017) and Carroll (2017) 
summarize the progress and discuss the promise of measurement of macroeconomic 
expectations. Papers by Arrondel et al. (2017), Bordalo et al. (2017), and Fuster et al. (2017) 
included with ours for presentation at the AEA 2018 session on “Subjective Expectations, Belief 
Formation, and Economic Behavior,” are recent advances in this literature. 
Using Subjective Expectations To Study Labor Supply and Its Relation with Health.
Advancing and combining earlier ideas on use of probabilistic expectations data to predict choice 
behavior in incomplete scenarios posed by the researcher (Manski (1999); see also Dominitz 
(1997), Wolpin (1999), and Blass et al. (2010)), and to estimate dynamic programming models 
(van der Klaauw (2012); see also Pantano and Zheng (2013)), we use choice expectations 
conditional on a specified future state, in addition to unconditional choice and state expectations, 
to quantify the causal effect of health on retirement and to provide an interpretation of the effect 
within two mainstream frameworks of econometric causality, the potential outcome framework 
(POF) and dynamic programming (DP).  
Methodologically our paper is closest to recent works by Arcidiacono et al. (2017) and 
Wiswall and Zafar (2016). These papers generate estimates of individual and aggregate level 
effects of college major choice on post-graduation outcomes of college undergraduates enrolled 
in two top U.S. universities, by comparing students’ subjective conditional expectations about 
post-graduation outcomes across alternative scenarios about their graduation major. Hence, these 
papers consider a modeling framework à la Roy (Roy, 1951), where potential treatments are 
alternative human capital investments (college majors) and potential outcomes are the monetary 
and/or non-monetary consequences of making alternative investments (occupation, earnings, 
marriage market outcomes, etc.).1 We, instead, focus on a class of models of intertemporal 
decision-making amenable to dynamic programming treatment, where potential treatments are 
1 These studies build on earlier work by Dominitz and Manski (1996) who elicit and analyze subjective earnings
distributions of a sample of Wisconsin high school students and college undergraduates under alternative scenarios 
for future schooling.
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alternative states of nature (individuals’ health) and potential outcomes are feasible actions that 
agents can take after learning the realized states (working vs. not).   
Within the labor supply literature, only a few studies to date have employed survey measures 
of subjective working and/or health expectations to study retirement behavior and its relationship 
with individuals’ health. In all cases, unconditional working probabilities have been used as an 
outcome variable in place of or in combination with actual labor supply data to estimate ceteris 
paribus effects (McGarry, 2004) or structural parameters (van der Klaauw and Wolpin, 2008). In 
turn, health and longevity expectations have been used to generate moment conditions for 
structural estimation (van der Klaauw and Wolpin, 2008), or to construct expectations-based 
health shocks (Shao, 2016). 
McGarry (2004) investigates the effect of health on labor supply expectations of working 
respondents in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). Using a simple regression analysis, the 
paper explores the roles of a variety of health measures (e.g., contemporaneous, lagged, and 
changes in self-reported health, diagnosed health conditions, and subjective longevity 
expectations), on respondents’ subjective probability of working past age 62 and its changes, 
finding large health effects. The key innovation of the analysis is to replace actual labor supply 
with unconditional working expectations as a dependent variable in order to focus on working 
respondents and avoid “justification bias” in self-reported health among retirees. Construction of 
counterfactuals, identification, and estimation are standard ones for mean linear regression.2 
van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008) develop and estimate a rich dynamic programming 
model of household retirement and savings, using multiple waves of the HRS. Innovating on 
earlier structural models of retirement, the authors combine respondents’ unconditional working 
and longevity expectations with observed realizations of respondents’ labor supply, health, and 
the other state variables in order to increase estimates precision rather than to aid parameters 
identification.3 Construction of counterfactuals, identification conditions, and estimation are 
otherwise standard for dynamic programming models.4 
Extending the reduced-form literature where health effects on retirement are identified off
health shocks, Shao (2016) employs subjective health expectations elicited in the 2006 HRS and 
2 Based on conditioning on the relevant set of regressors to the end of performing ceteris paribus comparisons.
3 In a related paper, van der Klaauw (2012) estimates a structural dynamic model of teacher career decisions under 
uncertainty where information on expected future occupation of NLS-72 respondents and their realized occupations 
are combined to improve estimates precision. 
4 For example, see Rust (1992), Magnac and Thesmar (2002), and Abbring (2010) for main identification results and
discussions. Pantano and Zheng (2013) propose using measures of unconditional subjective expectations for future 
choice or state variables to identify time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity in the first step of Hotz and Miller 
(1993)’s estimation method. Kalouptsidi et al. (2017) study identification of counterfactuals.  
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the corresponding health realizations observed in the 2010 HRS to construct an expectations-
based measure of health shock. She then uses this measure in standard regression analysis to 
investigate the effect of a health shock on observed labor supply and related outcomes.5 
In general, data on unconditional choice expectations, (or on choice expectations elicited 
under a single scenario), can be used to perform unconditional (or conditional) prediction of 
population behavior (see Manski (1999)). Combined with data on choice realizations, it can be 
further used to improve estimation efficiency (as in van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008)). 
Moreiver, its greater variation over realized choices can sometimes help address specific issues 
(as in McGarry (2004)). However, identification of treatment effects or structural parameters and 
extrapolation to alternative scenarios requires elicitation of conditional choice expectations under 
multiple alternative scenarios, or a combination of unconditional and conditional choice 
expectations (see Wolpin (1999)). This is the line we pursue in this paper. 
A small set of studies has investigated preferences for work and retirement arrangements 
using stated preference methods. For instance, Kapteyn et al. (2007) and van Soest and Vonkova 
(2014) study preferences for full and partial retirement in the Netherlands using hypothetical 
choices. These papers recognize that uncertainty about future health, employment, and other 
factors might play a role when respondents make their choice evaluations, nonetheless they do 
not incorporate these dimensions in the choice scenarios, nor they allow respondents to express 
uncertainty in the form of choice probabilities. Our approach explicitly addresses these aspects.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I deals with interpretation of the SeaTE as causal 
effects within the potential outcomes framework. Section II deals with interpretation of the 
SeaTE within the dynamic programming framework and discusses econometric implementation.
Section III presents the VRI study and describes the analytic sample and the main survey 
measures. Section IV presents individual and aggregate level estimates of the SeaTE directly 
obtained from the raw conditional probability data, investigates their predictors, and presents 
parameter estimates of a simple structural model of taste for work, health, and labor supply. 
Section V concludes by discussing work in progress and next steps.  
5 In fact, observed health shocks have been exploited in both structural models and more reduced-form analyses;
e.g., see Bound et al. (1999), Cai (2010), Disney et al. (2006), Maurer et al. (2011), McGeary (2009), van der 
Klaauw and Wolpin (2008), Garcia-Gomez (2011), Blundell et al. (2016), and Jones et al. (2016).  
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I. Subjective ex ante Treatment Effects (SeaTE)
In this section, we present our econometric approach based on measures of labor supply and 
health expectations and we compare it to more traditional approaches using data on realized 
health and labor supply. Our approach employs survey data on subjective working probabilities 
contingent on alternative hypothetical states of the person’s future health to construct measures 
of person-specific Subjective ex ante Treatment Effect (SaeTE) of health on labor supply and to 
characterize the implied distribution of ex ante treatment effects across the population.  
A major advantage of our expectations-based approach over the traditional approach based 
on realizations data is that it enables us to circumvent the logical impossibility of observing 
individuals’ counterfactual labor supply behavior corresponding to the health states that 
individuals do not experience. This is achieved by asking respondents to predict their labor 
supply behavior under all health states that they might experience. We additionally elicit 
respondents’ subjective expectations of experiencing those health states. Hence, for each 
respondent our data encompass probabilistic ex ante predictions of the respondent’s health and 
labor supply outcomes which ex post will be either realized (actual) or counterfactual.  
An important related advantage of this data structure is that it naturally allows for within-
person comparisons of (expected) labor supply behavior across alternative health states. These 
comparisons yield person-specific effect of health on labor supply and allow for unrestricted 
effect heterogeneity across individuals. This effect may be interpreted as a causal partial effect 
(as opposed to a non-causal or total one), under specific conditions (spelled out below). These 
conditions involve the relationship (or lack thereof) between the state variables whose values are 
set by the researcher in the elicitation scenario and, thus, are kept fixed by the respondent when 
reporting their labor supply expectations and those variables whose values are not specified by 
the researcher and, thus, might not be kept fixed by the respondent.6 
The ex ante approach and measures that we advance in this paper can be easily employed to 
study the causal relationship between health and retirement – or any other state and behavior – 
within two mainstream microeconometric frameworks, potential outcomes (POF)7 and dynamic 
programming (DP).8 Both frameworks involve the three main tasks characterizing any causal 
6 See Heckman (2003) for a discussion about the distinction between conditioning and fixing. In short, conditioning
refers to having a variable on the RHS of a regression.  Fixing involves an exogenous manipulation of that variable
that can have a causal interpretation.
7 This usually denotes the Rubin (1974, 1976)-Holland (1986)’s model of causality developed in statistics. However, 
we refer here to its interpretation and developments in econometrics, as discussed for instance in Heckman (2001, 
2005, 2008, 2010) and Manski (1995, 2007).
8 Eckstein and Wolpin (1989), Rust (1992, 1994), Keane and Wolpin (2009), Abbring (2010), Aguirribeira and Mira 
(2010), and Arcidiacono and Ellickson (2011) review the approach from various perspectives.
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analysis (see Heckman (2001, 2005, 2008, 2010)): (1) laying out a set of hypotheticals or 
counterfactuals alongside a mechanism of manipulation or selection for choosing them; (2) 
studying identification of the causal parameters under ideal population data;9 (3) estimating the 
parameters from actual data.  
Whereas empirical causal analyses have been overwhelmingly implemented using data on 
realizations of the relevant variables,10 the outlined three-task structure contains no restrictions 
limiting inference to parameters identifiable from ex post measures of realized hypotheticals. In 
this paper, we demonstrate how to use ex ante measures of predicted hypotheticals to identify 
and estimate causal parameters of interest, which can be given precise meaning both within the 
context of a DP model of retirement and within the context of a POF or regression-based analysis 
of the effect of health on retirement. 
While we view the ex post and ex ante approaches as complements rather than substitutes, 
the latter approach naturally delivers person-specific effects which, in turn, enable one to recover 
and analyze the implied population distributions of effects in a straightforward manner.11 
A. Treatment Effects in Realizations 
We consider a simple setting where labor supply is modelled as a binary variable. In period t, 
after observing the realized value of the state vector, sit , the decision maker decides whether to 
work or not: dit 1,0 , where 1 denotes working and 0 not working. The state vector, sit , 
includes the decision-maker’s health and other variables discussed below. Health is also 
modelled as a binary variable, hit 0,1 , where 1 denotes low health and 0 high health. 
Figure 1 illustrates the setting by means of a decision tree with three time periods. Within the 
context of a formal DP model of labor supply, the decision tree is the extensive-form
representation of the decision maker’s problem as a game against nature, where nodes are 
information sets and arcs are alternating decisions by nature and the agent (see Rust (1992)). 
Here we use the tree as a unifying tool to help us illustrate the connections between the POF and 
DP settings as well as between the ex post and ex ante approaches. 
N-labeled nodes (or N-nodes for short) denote nature’s decision points and A-labeled nodes 
(or A-nodes for short) denote the agent’s decision points. For simplicity we drop subscript i and 
9 These are called structural parameters in DP and treatment effects in the POF. 
10 These are called realized states and choices in DP and realized treatments and outcomes in the POF.
11 The VRI also has similar elicitation tasks for those who have stopped working. Its job separation module asks
conditional probability question analogous to the ones discussed in this paper, e.g., what is the percent chance that
the respondent would have continued to work conditional on high or low health. 
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display the simple case where health is the only state variable ( s  h ). At each N-node nature it it 
assigns a health level to the agent from the set of feasible health levels (high or low), represented 
as arcs exiting each N-node. In the figure, high-health arcs are labeled as H and low-health arcs 
as L. At each A-node the agent optimally chooses between working and not working after 
learning whether their health is high or low; thus, retirement is not necessarily an absorbing state. 
In the figure, working arcs are labeled as W and non-working arcs as ~W. At each terminal node 
the agent obtains a payoff, corresponding to a separate path through the tree.  
Arches exiting from N-nodes can be easily reinterpreted as feasible treatments and arches 
exiting from A-nodes as potential outcomes. At any given t, individual i is characterized by a 
response function, it   , which maps mutually exclusive and exhaustive health treatments into d hit
labor supply outcomes. Hence, d hit  is the potential outcome of person i at time t associatedit  
with treatment hit . 
Within-person differences in potential outcomes across pairs of hypothetical treatments yield 
individual-level treatment effects of the form,
  d      (1.1)1 d 0 ,  it it it 
    1,0,1 
contemporaneous to the time of the decision. Recovering this effect entails the evaluation and 
comparison of the labor supply decisions that person i would make in two mutually exclusive 
and alternative states of the world at time t, described respectively by hit 1 and hit  0 . 
For example, consider an agent who is initially in high health and working, represented by 
the thickened solid path in Figure 1. Conditional on being alive at time (t+1) (assumed in the 
figure), this agent will be “treated” with either high health or low health in that period. The 
individual-level treatment effect of health on labor supply at time (t+1) for this particular agent is 
given by the difference in the agent’s labor supply decisions across the two health states at (t+1),
corresponding to equation (1.1) with t replaced by (t+1), 1 replaced by L, and 0 replaced by H. 
Let now 0,1 denote the actual health state of person i at time t, where 0 means low 
with it  . Here being treated corresponds to experiencing a negative health shock 
zit 
health and 1 high health as before. Then, d dit   z  0,1 is the person’s realized outcome,it  it 
that is the labor supply alternative i actually selects given that they experience health state zit ; 
whereas, d 1  z 0,1   is the person’s counterfactual outcome, or the labor supply alternativeit it 
that i would have selected had they experienced health state 1  zit  . 
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Continuing with the example in Figure 1, let us assume that the agent happens to experience 
low health at time (t+1) and decides not to work in that period. Then, zi t, 1   L is the actual 
treatment and d  ~ W is the realized outcome, represented by the thickened dashed path. The i t, 1  
high health-working combination, (H, W), represented by the thickened dotted path is instead 
counterfactual. The counterfactual outcome corresponding to the unrealized treatment is 
logically unobservable.12 Hence, any attempt to causal analysis using data on realized treatment 
and outcomes requires construction of the relevant counterfactuals. 
Different econometric approaches deal with this issue differently (e.g., see Heckman et al. 
(1999)). Most regression-based approaches within the POF compare outcomes across groups of 
suitably similar persons rather than within person. A popular parameter choice is the Average 
Treatment Effect (ATE),  
ATE 1 0  it     t     E d [ 1  dit     0 ]  (1.2) 
 it    E d     , E d 1   it 0  
where  it  h E d    denotes the mean of the population labor supply distribution at time t if 
everyone were to experience health state h, covariates are omitted for simplicity, and 
E dit  h   P dit    h  1  as d is binary. Decomposition of the two expectations into realized   
and counterfactual components yields,  
  0  E d 1 |  z 1 P  z 1  E d 1 | z  0 P z  0ATEt 1   it    it   it    it  it    it  (1.3)    z  0 P  z  0  E d    z 1 P z  . E d  0 |    0 |   1 it it  it  it it  it 
Random sampling of z dit , it  from the population distribution of realized health and labor supply 
asymptotically reveals all components of (1.3) but the counterfactual distributions, 
E d  1 | it  0    zit 1 . Thus, without additional assumptions on these  it z  and E dit 0 |   
counterfactual distributions, the ATE parameter is not (point) identified (e.g., see Manski (1995, 
2003)). 
Studies based on randomized control trials (RCT) address the identification problem by 
randomly assigning subjects to treatments. For example, suppose that individuals are randomly 
assigned to either a Control group or to a Treatment group. Control individuals receive treatment 
zit  0 ; whereas, treated individuals receive treatment zit 1. In the ideal case of perfect 
randomization, treatment and control individuals are identical with respect to all observable and 
12 Since Holland (1986) this impossibility has been referred to as the “fundamental problem of causal inference.” 
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unobservable characteristics but their treatment status. Hence, the distribution of realized 
outcomes in each group can be used as a measure of the counterfactual outcome distribution for 
the other group.13 Formally,  
E d | i Treatment  E d 1 |  i Control   E d 1         it  it   it  (1.4)
E d  it | i Control   E d it  0 | i Treatment   E d   0 . it  
These conditions yield point identification of the ATE parameter in (1.3),  
ATE t 1 0   E dit     1   E dit     0   E d it  | i Treatment   E d  it  | i Control . (1.5) 
Obviously, randomization of good and bad health across individuals is not a viable strategy 
to study the causal relationship between health and labor supply of interest to this paper. The 
bulk of the literature to date has relied on data on health and labor supply realizations, thus 
having to grapple with non-random selection of individuals into health states, formally,   
 1 E d  (0) | z  0E d  (0) | z   it it it it (1.6)  (1) | z  0  E d  (1) | z 1 . E d  it it it it 
Equation (1.6) says that the observed labor supply distribution among high-health (respectively 
low-health) individuals is likely to differ from the unobserved labor supply distribution that those 
individuals would have featured had they experienced low (respectively high) health. 
Whenever longitudinal data on health and labor supply realizations are available, a popular 
strategy has been to identify the effect of interest off health shocks. This approach, however, 
requires observation of a sufficient number of shocks (“switching states”) in the data and makes 
it challenging to extrapolate to individuals who have yet to experience any shock and/or might be 
unlikely to experience any. More importantly, it requires that the health change be uncorrelated 
with respect to other factors affecting retirement in order to identify a casual effect.14 
B. Treatment Effects in Expectations 
The approach we advance is this paper circumvents the impossibility of simultaneously 
observing d   and dit 0 ex post by measuring them ex ante. This is done by directly askingit 1  
individuals to predict their outcome (decision in this case) at specific horizons under specified 
13 Unfortunately, perfectly implemented social experiments or randomized control trials are hard to find in practice 
(e.g., see Heckman and Smith (1995), Heckman (1996)). 
14 Another approach exploits the availability of some instrument. For instance, Rohwedder and Willis (2010) use 
cross-country variation in retirement policies to estimate the causal effect of retirement timing on cognition. In 
general, finding sources of random variation in health is challenging. 
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scenarios about their treatment (health state in this case) at those horizons.15 We define the 
Subjective ex ante Treatment Effect
SeaTE i t ( , ,   )  Ei t,  ( it  ) 
1  d 0  Ei t,  dit    Ei t,   it       (1.7) 
 P d      P d    01 1 1 ,  i t,   it   i t,   it   
as the individual-level expectation at t   of the individual level treatment effect at t,  it . We 
measure the SeaTE by eliciting the probability of the decision in a survey  periods in advance. 
Specifically, we elicit the percent chance of decision it   1 given hit  equal to 0 and 1.d hit 
These individual-level effects can be aggregated across individuals to generate subjective ex 
ante versions of popular group-level parameters (see Cornelissen et al. (2016) for a recent 
review); for example, the Average Subjective ex ante Treatment Effect (ASeaTE), the Average 
Subjective ex ante Treatment Effects on the Treated (ASeaTT), and the Average Subjective ex 
ante Treatment Effects on the Untreated (ASeaTU), defined as following: 
ASeaTE t ,  E SeaTE i t ( ,  ,   ) ,  
   
    
i t, t,   E  ( , ,  ) ,  ASeaTT  SeaTE i t   (1.8)
E    i t,    
 1 i t, t    E  ( , ,  ) ,  ASeaTU ,  SeaTE i t  
E 1  i t,      
where  i t,   Prob i t  ,  hit  1  is agent’s i subjective probability at time t   of entering health 
state 1 (low health) in the period t and the expectations are taken across individuals. Thus, the 
latter two parameters are weighted averages of the S TE  ea i t , ,    . The ASeaTT gives more 
weight to individuals with higher subjective probability of entering low health (=being treated), 
whereas the ASeaTU gives more weight to individuals with higher probability of remaining in 
high health (=being untreated). The ASeaTT and ASeaTU parameters in (1.8) are functions of 
individuals’ expectations about their future health in addition to their working expectations under 
alternative health scenarios, which we also elicit in the survey. These parameters can be 
consistently estimated using their sample analogs.  
15 Following Manski (1999), a scenario can be formalized a function assigning a potential choice set and 
environment to each member of the population. Hence, it is interpretable as a treatment policy or program. In our
application, we focus on specification or fixing of specific features of the choice environment (a state variable) and
leave the choice set unspecified. We assume that the latter consists of the two alternative options of working vs. not 
working.
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Measurement and interpretation of the individual-level SeaTE does not rely on specific 
assumptions about the nature of respondents’ expectations. However, as noted by Arcidiacono et 
al. (2017), “If individuals form rational expectations over their future outcomes, and in the 
absence of unanticipated aggregate shocks, this [the ASeaTE] parameter coincides with the 
mean (ex post) effect of treatment on outcome.” Thus, the aggregate population parameters and 
their estimates are more directly interpretable under the assumption that individuals form rational 
expectations about their future health. For example, under this assumption, the expressions for 
ASeaTT and ASeaTU still hold after replacing the subjective health probability  with the 
health indicator h .16 
II. Dynamic Programming Interpretation of SeaTE 
In this section, we relate the SeaTE to the individuals’ decision problem. Doing so allows us to 
have an interpretation of the SeaTE in terms of the individuals’ optimization problem or, to be 
more explicit, about the role of the health state in the decision and, hence, about the meaning of 
conditional expectations with respect to the choice environment. 
Individual agents are represented by primitives, u s  ,d and  s | s ,d . As before, i   it it it it , 1i t  it it 
 , N and t   ( d )indexes individuals and t time periods, with i 1, 0,1,..., T  . u s  , is theit it it 
utility that agent i derives in period t from choosing labor supply dit 0,1 , given the 
realizations of the state variables collected in sit (the state vector), including health and other 
variables. Because health and the other state variables are generated by a Markovian stochastic 
process governing their evolution over time, their future values are uncertain from the viewpoint 
of the decision-maker. Specifically,  it (si t , 1 | sit ,dit )  is agent i’s subjective probability over the 
states’ realizations in the next period (t+1), conditional on the agent’s information set in the 
current period. The latter is summarized by the realized state and decision at t (as opposed to the 
whole history of states and choices since the first period), as implied by the Markov-process 
assumption. 
With additively time-separable utility, the agent’s utility functional at t is given by 
16As discussed in Manski (1999), some weakened forms of rational expectations (e.g., respondents’ subjective 
choice probabilities for a certain action are unbiased estimates of their objective probabilities of choosing that 
action), and of statistical independence of the realized treatments across the population (needed for applicability of 
the law of large numbers), would leave the above conclusion intact. However, aggregate shocks making treatments 
dependent across the population and systematic deviations from rational expectations in the form of biased 
expectations would generally invalidate it.
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jU  u s ,d  (1.9)it i t ,  j i t ,  j i t ,  j 
j0 
where  is the discount factor. The agent behaves optimally according to the expected-utility 
maximizing decision rule, *   , which satisfies the Bellman (1957)’s optimality principle.  it sit 
That is, at any time t and state sit , it * is optimal also for the continuation process featuring the 
current state as starting point, 
*  * *    arg max u s , d   V s , s , 1    si t | s , d , (1.10) sit  it it it  , 1  i t  , 1       , 1 it it  it   i t  , 1  i t  i t  it dit  0,1 s i t, 1   
where V *  is the value function representing the expected present discounted value of lifetime i t, 1
utility from following  * . This expression makes transparent that *    is a deterministic it  it sit
function of sit , given the primitives.17 
A. Dynamic Programming Fixing Health 
Our approach elicits respondents’ expectations about their labor supply in  periods, both 
unconditionally and upon fixing the level of future health. Because health is just one element of 
the state vector, sit , interpretation of respondents’ answers within the context of the DP 
framework requires that the state vector be partitioned into components that are specified or 
fixed by the researcher in the elicitation task and those that are not specified.  
In general, interpretation of respondents’ answers and of the derived SeaTE parameters 
depends on the relationship (or lack thereof) between the specified and unspecified components 
of the state vector. We therefore partition the state vector into variables fixed in the elicitation 
task and variables not fixed in the elicitation task. We further partition the latter into variables 
that the researcher could reasonably fix in the elicitation task, if they decided to do so, and 
variables capturing any residual uncertainty of the agent at the time of elicitation about aspects of 
the choice environment that might affect their future decision.
Formally, sit  (xit , yit , it ) , where xit denotes the specified component of sit , yit denotes the 
unspecified component of sit , and  it denotes the residual component of sit . Under this 
partition, the expression for the agent’s utility in equation (1.9) becomes 
17 Following Rust (1992) and the traditions of the DP literature, at this point we specify this dynamic program at a 
high level of abstraction including leaving constraints implicit. When we give an example below, we will introduce 
the relevant constraints. 
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 
jU  u x , y ,  , d , (1.11)it  i t  ,  j ,  i t   j ,  i t   ji t j  , i t j  , 
j0 
and the related expression for the agent’s optimal solution in equation (1.10) becomes  
, ,  arg  max  u x y  , d   *  x y    , ,  it it it it it  it it it it 
d 0,1 it   
* * xy  V x , y ,  , x , y ,   x , y ,  |  x , y ,  , d i t, 1  , 1 i t  , 1 i t, 1  , 1 i t  , 1  it   i t, 1  , 1 , 1  it  it  it  i t  , 1 i t   i t  , 1 i t   i t  i t it  x , 1 , yi t , , 1  i t  , 1  i t 
(1.12) 
where summations are implicitly taken as many times as required by the dimension of the state 
vector.
In our application, we specify the individual’s health state so x  h , while leavingit it 
unspecified in yit  additional factors typically assumed to affect retirement decision (e.g., family 
and financial conditions, income, and so on).18 
Because xit is fixed in the elicitation task, it is no longer stochastic to the respondent at the 
time of elicitation. We maintain that the respondent treats it as fixed when reporting their 
subjective labor supply expectations given health. In this context, the variation in health should 
be regarded as experimental, so even if health is endogenous, because we are fixing health, the 
estimates can have a causal interpretation.19 
On the other hand, yit and  it are stochastic from the perspective of time of elicitation. We 
assume that respondents hold subjective distributions for the unspecified components of the 
choice environment at time t  and allow them to express any uncertainty they might have about 
future decision,  *  x y, ,  , due to the uncertainty they might perceive about yit and .it it it it it 
18 Because it is generally impractical–if not at all infeasible–for a researcher to fully describe relevant scenarios to 
respondents, specified scenarios are generally incomplete (Manski, 1999). An incomplete scenario can be thought of
and formalized as a collection of scenarios, each sharing some common feature (the specified components). In our
application, scenarios have in common a specified health level and a horizon length. Because the agent’s age at the 
time of choice is simply equal to their age at the time of elicitation plus the horizon, we handle this by including the 
individual’s age in the state vector. Furthermore, it is important to notice that the elicitation tasks implicitly 
condition on being alive. Likewise, the Markov transitions are implicitly conditional on being alive. Using the 
standard convention that utility when dead is normalized to be zero, conditioning on being alive is natural and has
no effect on the optimization problem. A full model would, of course, need to account for mortality risk.
19 In particular, we assume that agents place themselves in the hypothetical situation defined by the scenario, without
trying to infer why one or the other scenario might be realized. Dominitz and Manski (1996) discuss this issue 
within the context of elicitation of students’ expectations for future earnings under hypothetical scenarios about their 
schooling. (See also Dominitz (1997) for additional discussion and examples.) In the setting considered by Dominitz 
and Manski (1996), and more recently by Arcidiacono et al. (2017) and Wiswall and Zafar (2016), the most subtle
aspect of elicitation is to avoid that respondents condition on endogenously choosing the schooling levels posed by
the scenario. 
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Absent this uncertainty about factors driving choices in the future, respondents would give either 
a zero or one response to the elicitation task because labor supply in the future would be a 
deterministic function of health.20 
We will now discuss two main cases concerning the stochastic structure of xit  and yit , whose 
distinction bears consequence for interpretation of respondents’ answers and the nature of 
SeaTE. The first and more general case allows yit to depend on xit either deterministically or 
stochastically. In our example, yit  would include wage. In virtually all microeconomic models of 
retirement, bad health affects agents’ labor supply by increasing their disutility of working and
by lowering their productivity (e.g., see French and Jones (2011, 2017)). The second case deals 
with the simpler situation where xit  and yit  are independent. 
Without loss of generality because yit  embodies all omitted factors that could be specified, 
we maintain that  it is orthogonal to xit  and yit , which implies 
xy xy  21 x , y ,  | x , y ,  , d    x , y  | x , y  , d     |  , d  . Note i t , 1  , 1  i t  it it it it it , 1  i t  it it it it  , 1it   i t  , 1    i t  , 1   i t  it it 
that   here is unknown to both the econometrician and the individual at the time of elicitation.  
This contrasts to the more typical setting for modeling outcome data where the respondent knows 
a component that is unobserved to the econometrician.  
Given this partitioning, equation (1.12) becomes  
 * x y     arg max  u  x , y , , ,   ,d  it it it it it  it it it it  
it  d  1,0 
* * y  Vi  t  x  , y  , i t  , , 1 xi t , y ,  ,     yi t | x , , y , d dy       i t  |  , d  ,       , 1  i t, 1  i t  , 1  , 1  i t  , 1  i t  1 i t  , 1  it  , 1  i t  1 it  it  i t  , 1  it   , 1 it  it  d i t  1 xi t, 1  i t    , 1 yi t, 1   
x  x y ,d  x , 1 | ,it i t  it it it 
(1.13) 
where we replace summation with integral to allow for the possibility that y and  are 
continuous. 
The expectation of the optimal decision *  , , x y    as of the time of elicitation t-1 isit it it it 
20 That is, using the terminology of Blass et al. (2010), these subjective distributions express resolvable uncertainty, 
as they refer to utility components whose values may be unknown to the respondent (and the researcher) at the time 
of elicitation, but will be known by the respondent at the time of choice. A respondent may also face unresolvable 
uncertainty, concerning future utility components that will still be unknown to them at the time of choice. The latter 
components do not generate uncertainty in the elicitation task, as they are subsumed by the continuation value in the 
dynamic programming problem.
21 Here we treat   as a scalar. Each process of the choice environment could feature its own residual component, 
e.g., one in the agent’s utility, one in the wage process, and so on.
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P   * , ,i t , 1  it  xit yit  it  1 
* y  x   , ,      x y     y | x , x , y , d dy    |  , d d  x | x , y , d it  it  it  it  i t, 1 it  it  i t, 1 i t, 1 i t, 1 it  i t, 1 it  i t, 1 i t, 1 it  i t, 1 it  i t, 1 i t, 1 i t  , 1    
xit  y  
Pi t   x y   1|  x  1 x x  , 1, y , , d ,  , 
it it 
 * , ,   x |, 1   it it it it it  i,t it  i t   i t  1 i t  1 
xit 
(1.14) 
where the expression for   , ,  is given in (1.13) and P  x , ,y   1|  x  in the* x y     * it it it it i t , 1  it it it it it 
last line of the expression is the individual’s expected optimal decision in period t, obtained by 
integrating  * x y, ,  with respect to the distributions of  and and by evaluating theit  it it it  it yit
resulting function at a particular realization of xit specified by the elicitation task. 
That is, from the viewpoint of a respondent at time (t-1), their optimal choice at time t, 
* x y  , is a random variable, as it is a function of random variables yit , and  . As  , ,  xit ,it it it it it 
the elicitation scenario fixes the value of xit , the uncertainty associated to the stochastic process 
xfor  gets partialed out into the transition probabilities,  x | , ,  d  . On the other hand, x yxit it i t , 1 it it it 
uncertainty may remain about yit and  it . For this reason, we allow respondents to report their 
expected choice probabilistically, expressed as their subjective probability of working contingent 
on the specified value of the state. 
Specifically, we elicit all components of (1.14), as follows:  
(i) On the right-hand side of (1.14), the probability of working given fixed values of the 
specified state component, P  *  x y, ,   1 | x  , and the probability of the i t , 1   it it it it it 
specified state,    | , y , d  , with x  h . x x xi t  , 1  it  , 1  i t, 1 ,  it iti t   i t  1 
(ii) On the left-hand side of (1.14), the unconditional probability of working, 
*Pi t , 1  it  xit , ,yit  it   1 . 
Clearly, health can affect the unconditional probability of working through three channels. 
The first channel is preference (i.e., agent’s utility). The second is the mechanism or mechanisms
represented by the unspecified component, yit , (in our example, wage or productivity). The third 
is uncertainty (i.e., agent’s subjective belief about the stochastic process governing health ).  
On the other hand, health only affects the conditional working probabilities, 
P   it *  1|  xit   Pi t , 1   it *  xit , yit , it   1|  x  , through the first two channels. This observation i t , 1      it 
is key to interpretation of the SeaTE, which is given by the difference in subjective conditional 
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probabilities of working across values of the specified state component. The 1-period-ahead 
SeaTE of health h on labor supply for individual i at time t is equal to, 
S TE  i t  * 1 * ea   ,  ,1  P    1 | h    Pi t 1  it  1 | hit  0 . (1.15)i t , 1  it it  ,   
As long as y may depend on h, in equations (1.13) and (1.14) the agent integrates over the future 
values of yit that are consistent with the values of hit  fixed in the elicitation task. The main 
implication for interpretation of the SeaTE in equation (1.15) is that in this case the measured 
effect is a total effect. That is, it is the effect of health, operating through all of the mechanisms
by which health affects labor supply. In our working illustration, it is the effect of health on labor 
supply through both utility and productivity.22 
B. Econometric Implementation: Ex ante and Conditional Value Functions 
To implement the model econometrically it is useful to re-write the conditional choice 
probabilities in (1.14) in terms of the ex ante value function and the conditional value function. 
The DP literature makes specific additivity and orthogonality assumptions that permit estimation. 
Following Arcidiacono and Ellickson (2011), the ex ante (or integrated) value function at a 
generic future time t, V *  x , is the continuation value of being in state obtained byit it xit
integrating V x , y ,  over and  , that is,it it it it yit it 
* * * y  
it      V  x , ,   x , y ,   i t  y | x , yi t  , d ,   it it it,  dV x y     dy     it it it it it it it it it , 1  it it , 1  i t 1 
 yit it 
* x y  u  x , ,  d    d   V      x | , , d   y | , y   x  x y    x y  , d dy  it i t i t  i t 1 i t  i t 1   it it it it it  , 1 , 1  it i t , 1 it it it ,  it it , 1 ,  it 
xy   it it  i t, 1   
(1.16) 
This formulation assumes additivity and serial independence of the residual component  it in 
order to deliver the standard single-crossing result for a discrete choice problem.23  In 
Arcidiacono and Ellickson’s setting, the econometrician is doing the integration, while in ours it 
is the respondent. 
The conditional value function v  x , y , d  is the present discounted value net of it ofit it it it 
choosing dit  and behaving optimally from period (t+1) onward, that is, 
 y d   u x , ,  d   V * x  x x x y , d  (1.17)v x  , ,   y       | ,  .it i t  i t  ,it it it it it it it , 1  , 1  it i t 1 it it it 
xi t, 1 
22 One could decompose the effect of health that operates through wages versus other factors by conditioning on 
wages and health jointly in the elicitation task. We are pursuing this approach in future surveys. 
23 Additionally, its transition probability is normalized to be the same across individuals without loss of generality. 
  d .   it it 
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The conditional value function is a key component for forming the conditional choice 
probabilities that we measure and that use as a basis for estimation of the parameters of the 
simple structural model that we specify below. Specifically, equation (1.13) can be re-written as 
it 
*  it , it ,it   arg max vit xit , yit , dit  it it  x y       d  , (1.18) 
d  1,0 it 
and the conditional choice probabilities in equation (1.14) can be re-written as  
 * x , , 1|  x Pi t , 1  it  it yit it  it  
* y   , ,   y | ,  x , y , d  dy  x y   x    d   it it it  , 1   it it i t , 1 , 1  , 1    it i t  i t  i t  it it it 
it yit 
         d arg max v  x , y , d  d  y  y | x , x , y , d dy     .i t  ,  , 1  it it    it it it it it it  i t , 1 it it , 1  i t 1 i t  it 
d  1,0 it yit  it 
(1.19) 
Since we measure P  * x y, ,  1 | x  directly, equation (1.19) links our data to the i t , 1  it  it it it  it 
primitives of the model.  
C. Interpreting Conditional Probability Responses in DP Framework 
We now present a simple model to illustrate how our dynamic programming framework can be 
used to elicit information about individual-specific valuations using the standard assumption that 
underlie econometric implement of the DP framework.  As above, we treat work and health as 
binary. 
First consider the case where there is no unspecified variable. As in the discussion of 
decision tree (Figure 1), let dit {W , ~ W }be work and not work and health state 
x h { , }    H L  be high or low.24 Because there are only four combinations of health states and it it 
V h  , dlabor decisions at time t, it is easy to write out the problem. Define   to be the value ofit it it 
individual i of being in state h and making choice d at time t given expectation and optimization 
from t+1 onward. Then 
 , d  (1 h )d v H ,., W   W      d ) v H ,., ~ W      V h         (1  ~ Wit it it it it it it it it it (1.20) 
 h d          v L,., W   W (1 d ) v L,., ~ W       ~ W it it it it it it it 
where the first row refers to actions in high health and the second row in low health.  
24 Recall that the indicators dit=1 corresponds to working and hit=1 corresponds to low health. 
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Given this standard dynamic programming formulation, maximizing it  dit  yields theV hit , 
standard single crossing conditions for the specified health states as follows. 
When H 
W  if 0  vit H ,., W   vit H ,., ~ W    it    W  it ~W  
~ W otherwise (1.21)When L 
W  if 0  v L,., W   v L,., ~ W    W         ~ Wit it it it 
~ W otherwise 
Again, as traditional in dynamic programming applications, we define objects that are the 
differenced conditional value functions and of the residual components.  Let 
itH  v H ,., W   vit H ,., ~ W  it 
itL  v L ,., W   vit L,., ~ W  (1.22) it 
     W  ~ W     it it it 
where again the differencing is across the working and not working decision. Note that because 
the residual components across decisions are independent of elements of the state vector, then 
their difference  it is also independent. In terms of these variables, the single cross conditions for 
working given health state become
* H When H ,  it 1 if 0 it  it 
 0 otherwise (1.23)* L When L,  it 1 if 0 it  it   
 0 otherwise 
where we are using the 0/1 notation for working to be transparently analogous to discrete choice 
dynamic programming econometrics.   
We now show how conditional probability estimates can measure the differenced conditional 
value functions with arbitrary heterogeneity across individuals. At the time of elicitation, the
survey respondents need to integrate out the residual component.  Therefore, to analyze the 
conditional probabilities, we make a distributional specification for the residual uncertainty it . 
Denote the cumulative distribution function of it as  . Since the differenced conditional value 
function (and the underlying utility functions) are only defined up to scale and location, we can 
take the   to be zero mean and unit variance without loss of generality as in the standard 
discrete choice model. 
The survey’s elicitation task maps precisely into the discrete choice problem in (1.23).  
Specifically, the question
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If your health is excellent/very good/good two years from now, 
what are the chances that you will be working for pay? 
yields 
H *P, 1  Pi t , 1   it 1|  hit  H  (1.24)i t  
and 
If your health is fair/poor two years from now, what are the 
chances that you will be working for pay? 
yields 
L *P, 1  Pi t, 1   it  1|  hit   L (1.25)i t     
Then (1.23) given the distributional assumption for it  implies 
H HP   i t, 1 it  (1.26)
PL    L . i t, 1 it  
We invert these expressions to yield
H 1 Hit    (Pi t , 1 ) (1.27)
L 1 Lit    (Pi t , 1 ).  
Given a functional form for  , the individually-elicited conditional probabilities yield 
individual-level measures of the conditional value of working versus not working in high and 
low health.25 To implement (1.27), one needs to specify a distribution such as  . In what 
follows, we will specify the distribution as normal. 
Note that this case, where there is no unspecified component of the state vector y, covers 
many cases of interest.  The value function may shift for multiple reasons given health.  
Preferences for work versus leisure may be a function of health; wages may be a function of 
health; medical costs may be a function of health.  If these are all deterministic functions of
health for an individual then the value functions given in (1.27) will completely characterize 
decision making.  Hence, they can be used to infer the causal effect of health.  One might, 
however, want separate measurements based on y. There would be two reasons for these 
separate measurements.  The first would be to separate the channels for health affecting work, 
e.g., separating the role of preferences and wages.  The second would be if the nonspecified state 
25 Note that there are two level of conditioning.  First, the netting of the residual uncertainty defines the conditional 
value function.  On top of this, our elicitation task is done fixing health. 
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y were related to health, though not perfectly. The appendix shows how the conditional 
probabilities can be interpreted in this second case.  
III. Eliciting Conditional Probabilities:  Survey and Basic Results 
A. The Vanguard Research Initiative (VRI) 
The VRI is a survey-administrative linked dataset on older wealthholders. Survey respondents 
are account holders at the Vanguard Group who are aged 55 and above, are web-survey eligible, 
and have at least $10,000 in financial assets at Vanguard. 
As of December 2015, four surveys were completed by a panel of about 3,000+ respondents, 
with each survey focusing on a different aspect of retirement decision-making. Our analysis is 
based mainly on Survey 4 (Labor), while Survey 1 (Wealth), Survey 2 (Long-term Care), and 
Survey 3 (Transfers) provide relevant covariates. 
Survey 4 begins by asking whether or not an individual is working. If so, it gets facts about 
the current job and establishes if it is the career job (Current job battery). If yes, it gets 
information about whether the individual is searching for another job (On-the-job search 
battery). If not, it gets information about the career job, separation from it, and subsequent search 
(Career job, Separation, and Career-to-bridge search batteries). If not working, there is a similar 
sequence starting with information about last job. This sequence establishes information about 
career job, bridge job (if relevant), and the transitions and search. 
Respondents who were working in either a career job or bridge job at the time of Survey 4 
were asked a series of questions regarding their labor supply and health expectations (described 
below), which constitute the main measures on which the SeaTE and related aggregate 
parameters are based.
B. Selection and Description of the Analytic Samples
We select our sample from respondents who meet the following criteria: (i) who have taken the
first 4 surveys of the VRI; (ii) who were working at the time of Survey 4 and, thus, eligible to 
answer the labor supply and health expectations battery;26 (iv) who gave complete and consistent 
responses to the latter battery; and (iv) who reported being in high health in Survey 4.27 Table 1 
summarizes the selection process and provides the relevant figures at each step. 
26 Some of these individuals had already retired from their career job and were working in a bridge job at the time of 
the survey. These individuals, too, were asked the expectations questions just described with reference to their
bridge job.
27 As fewer than 3% of respondents reported being in low health (fair or poor), we decided to exclude this small
group and focus on the majority of respondents who reported being in high health (excellent, very good, or good). 
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The final sample amounts to 970 respondents aged 57 to 81, currently in high health and 
working. Sample size decreases to 839 respondents for the analysis of expectations with a 4 
years horizon, which applies to individuals who reported a positive probability of working in 2 
years. Table 2 summarizes the main characteristics of the two analytic samples which we use for 
the 2 and 4 years analyses. 
As easily seen in Table 2, the VRI respondents tend to be wealthier, more educated, and 
healthier than the general population. However, conditional on the sample screens (age, positive 
financial wealth, internet access) used to select the sample, they are broadly similar to those from
the HRS and the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) (Ameriks et al., 2015). Our main analytic 
sample is further selected as it is made of working respondents in good or better health. This 
sample therefore represents a subpopulation of particular interest for our analysis, as it is made of 
individuals who in principle have the capacity to work longer but for whom assessing the casual 
link between health and retirement is particularly challenging as they have not experienced the 
health shocks used for identification in standard approaches using realizations data.
C. Elicited Probabilities: Summary Statistics and Internal Validity 
Do currently healthy older workers expect to work in 2 (4) years? Do they expect to have the 
health capacity to work at those horizons? Were they (not) to have the capacity to work in 2 (4) 
years, how would their labor supply expectations change?
To answer these questions we begin by analyzing respondents’ labor supply and health 
expectations at 2 and 4 years. Specifically, eligible VRI respondents were first asked for the 
percent chance out of 100 that they will be working in 2 years from the point of the survey. Next, 
they were asked for their self-rated health on a 5-point scale (Excellent, Very Good, Good, Fair, 
and Poor) and for the percent chance out of 100 that their health will be some particular state 
(discussed next) in 2 years.28 Finally, respondents were asked about their probability of working 
in the next 2 years, conditional on different health states. These questions were then repeated for 
the 4 years horizon.
28 The VRI uses the standard five point scale for self-assessed health. To economize on the number of questions, 
conditional expectations module used only partitions that group health states. The partition of future health states 
used in the questions depends on the current level of health reported by the respondent. For example, respondents in 
excellent health were asked about their likelihood of being in very good/good and fair/poor health in 2 and 4 years.
The partitions used map uniquely to the high (excellent/very good/good) and low (fair/poor) dichotomous
classification used in this paper.  See Table 3 (VRI Survey 4, health_fill table) for the partitions.  
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The partition of future health states used in the questions eliciting respondents’ health 
expectations and working expectations given health depends on the current level of health 
reported by the respondent at Survey 4. For example, consider a respondent who reported being 
in good health. This respondent was asked the following sequence of questions for the 2 (and 4) 
years horizon: 
1) What are the chances that you will be working 2 years from now?
[fill-in box]% 
2) What are the chances that your health will be fair or poor 2 years
from now? [fill-in box]% 
3) What are the chances that your health will be very good or excellent 
2 years from now? [fill-in box]%
4) If your health is very good or excellent 2 years from now, what are 
the chances that you will be working for pay? [fill-in box]%
5) If your health is good 2 years from now, what are the chances that 
you will be working for pay? [fill-in box]%
6) If your health is fair or poor 2 years from now, what are the 
chances that you will be working for pay? [fill-in box]%
Table 3 shows the exact partition of future health states used in the questions as a function of 
self-reported health at Survey 4. The health fills 1 and 2 refer to the health states used in the 
health expectations questions, whereas the health fills 3-5 refer to the health states used in the 
questions measuring the respondent’s expectations of working given health. 
Unconditional working expectations. We analyze 2 and 4 years working expectations of these 
individuals elicited on a 0-100 scale of chance, where 0 means “no chance of working 2 (4) years 
from now” and 100 means “will work for sure 2 (4) years from now.” Sample distributions 
(mean, standard deviation, and main quantiles) of survey answers are shown in Table 4. 
Respondents’ working expectations at 2 and 4 years are heterogeneous and span the whole 
support of 0-100 percent chance scale. In column 1, over a third of the respondents (37.42%) 
expects that they will work for sure in 2 years, as opposed to the almost 10% of those who expect 
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not to work for sure. The remaining majority of respondents (approx. 53%) views working in 2 
years as an uncertain event. Nearly 12% of respondents report that they have 50 chances out of 
100 of working in 2 years;29 a similar fraction gives a percent chance below 50 percent; whereas 
almost 30% gives a percent chance above 50 percent (the second most frequent response 
category after 100 percent). Indeed, the median belief of 90 percent is quite high, indicating that 
half of the respondents expect to work in 2 years with a likelihood of 90 percent or higher. 
Column 2 shows main sample statistics for “calculated” unconditional working expectations, 
obtained by combining respondents’ working expectations conditional on health and their health 
expectations according to the law of total probability. In this case, the fraction of respondents 
who think that they will work for sure decreases to 17%, and the fraction of unsure respondents 
increases to 73%. However, the median probability is still very high and equal to 80 percent. 
Moreover, the medians, means, and standard deviations are very similar across the two 
distributions. 
As the time horizon increases from 2 to 4 years in column 3, the fraction of respondents who 
think that they will not work for sure and the fraction of uncertain respondents increase 
respectively to 12 and 77 percent, whereas the fraction of respondents who think that they will 
work for sure decreases to 11 percent. While respondents’ subjective probabilities of working in 
4 years are still fairly high overall (e.g., the 75th percentile is equal to 90 percent), these
probabilities tend to be lower than those with a 2 years horizon (e.g., the median is down to 50 
percent and the mean to 52.7 percent). 
Health expectations. Working VRI respondents are healthy; over 97% of them reported being in 
excellent, very good, or good health in Survey 4. Do these healthy working individuals expect to 
stay healthy or do they anticipate health declines?  
To answer this question we analyze respondents’ expectations of being in high versus low 
health in 2 and 4 years elicited on the usual 0-100 scale of chance.  
Features of the sample distributions (mean, standard deviation, and main quantiles) of
percent-chance expectations are shown in Table 5 for all respondents in our analytic sample. 
Expectations are constructed from questions asking respondents to report the percent chance that 
they will be in a specific health state (or set of states) in 2 and 4 years, where the possible states 
are excellent, very good, good, fair, and poor and where excellent, very good, and good were 
29 Some of these respondents might be using 50 percent as an expression of “epistemic uncertainty” (e.g., see 
Fischhoff and Bruine de Bruin (1999) and Bruine de Bruin et al. (2002)), thereby conveying that they don’t know or
are unsure about their chances of working in two years.  
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subsequently consolidated into “high health” and fair and poor were consolidated in “low 
health.”
Respondents’ expectations of being in high health in 2 and 4 years range between 20 and 100 
percent. Three fourths of the respondents report subjective likelihoods of being in high health in 
2 years equal to or above 75 percent and of being in high health in 4 years equal to or above 70 
percent. In fact, 10% of respondents expect to be in high health for sure in 2 years and 5% of 
them think that they will be in high health for sure in 4 years. Large fractions of healthy 
respondents express some uncertainty about their future health by reporting expectations strictly 
between 0 and 100 percent; about 90% for the 2 years horizon and 95% for the 4 years horizon. 
Overall, the majority of respondents appear fairly optimistic about their chances of remaining 
in high health – thus maintaining their capacity to work – as opposed to experiencing a health 
decline. The means of the distributions of respondents’ 2 years subjective probabilities of high 
and low health imply a forecast of the proportion of high health individuals equal to 83.4 percent 
and a forecast of the proportion of low health individuals equal to 16.6 percent. Similarly, the
means of the 4 years distributions imply ( )  76.5 percent and P L   23.5 percentP H  ( )
respectively.
Conditional working expectations given health. We additionally elicited respondents’ 2- and 4- 
year ahead working expectations conditional on alternative health scenarios by means of the 
familiar 0-100 scale of chance.
Table 6 displays the mean, standard deviation, and main quantiles of the sample distributions 
of percent-chance conditional working expectations for both health scenarios and prediction 
horizons. 
The sample distribution of working expectations conditional on experiencing high health in 2 
years, summarized in Column 1, is similar to its unconditional counterpart. In particular, about 
40% of respondents expect that they will work for sure in 2 years if their health is high; this 
proportion is 3 percentage points higher than the 37% of respondents who report an 
unconditional working probability of 100 percent. The remaining respondents are split between a 
group close to 10% who gives a 0 percent chance of working in 2 years if in high health and the 
remaining 50% who gives a percent chance strictly between 0 and 100 percent. As the first 
proportion is virtually identical to the proportion of 0s observed for the unconditional working 
probability, the second proportion is 3 percentage points lower than the corresponding proportion 
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of responses to the unconditional question, mechanically compensating for the 3% increase in the
100 percent answers.30 
The mean of the distribution of conditional working expectations given high health is equal 
to 70.5, higher than both the mean of the distribution of unconditional working probabilities as
directly reported by respondents (equal to 69.8 percent) and the mean of the distribution of 
calculated unconditional working probabilities (equal to 65.9 percent). The median working 
probability conditional on high health is equal to 90 percent and identical to the median 
probability of the distribution of self-reported unconditional working probabilities. 
The close similarity between reports of unconditional working probabilities and conditional 
working probabilities given high health at 2 years is consistent with the observed high 
probability that the majority of respondents assigns to the event of experiencing high health in 2 
years time. On the other hand, the distributions of the 4 years working probabilities, 
unconditional and conditional on high health, are less similar to each other than the 2 years 
distributions. This is also not surprising, as respondents’ expectations of experiencing high health 
in 4 years are lower than the 2 years expectations, while featuring greater cross-sectional 
variation. 
As the time horizon increases from 2 to 4 years between column 1 and column 3, the fraction 
of respondents who think that they will not work for sure and the fraction of uncertain 
respondents increase respectively to 12 and 57 percent, whereas the fraction of respondents who 
think that they will work for sure decreases to 31 percent. While the proportion of 0s is virtually 
identical to that observed for the distribution of the 4 years unconditional working probabilities 
in Table 4, the proportion of 100s is dramatically higher (31% versus 11%). In fact, both the 
mean and median probabilities of working in 4 years when experiencing high health (equal to 
58.7 and 68 percent respectively) are visibly higher than the corresponding mean and median 
probabilities of the unconditional distribution (equal to 52.7 and 50 percent).  
Having respondents entertain a scenario of low health – a negative and unlikely shock for the 
majority of them – lowers substantially their self-reported working expectations at both 2 years 
(in column 2) and 4 years (in column 4). For example, in the 2 years case the median of the 
distribution of the conditional working probabilities drops from 90 to 40 percent between high 
and low health states. Similarly, the mean drops from 71 to 42 percent. In the 4 years case, the
median drops from 68 to 20 percent and the mean from 59 to 33 percent. 
30 The fraction of 50 percent decreases slightly from 12% to 9%. A possible interpretation of this finding is that 
conditioning on future health reduces respondents’ perceived uncertainty about their chances of working in the
future.
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Entertaining a low health scenario appears to additionally increase respondents’ perceived 
uncertainty relative to the high health scenario; the fraction of respondents giving a response 
strictly between 0 and 100 percent increases from 50% to 64% under the 2 years horizon and 
from 58% to 62% under the 4 years horizon. 
Validation. Before moving to the analysis of the SeaTE, we perform some additional analysis of
the expectations responses in order to provide immediate evidence supporting the validity of our 
measures.  
Heterogeneity by age. As conditioning on health removes a potentially important source of 
uncertainty that respondents would otherwise need to factor in when answering the unconditional 
question, we hypothesize that subjective conditional probabilities might be even better predictors 
of conditional outcomes than unconditional probabilities are of the unconditional outcomes.  
A direct comparison between survey reports of the subjective conditional probability of 
working in 2-4 years with the conditional outcomes will become possible when the future waves 
of the VRI are fielded and participants’ labor supply observed. We do know, however, that labor 
supply features distinctive age peaks. Do working expectations track such peaks? To investigate 
this question, in Figures 2A-2C we create box-and-whiskers plots of the working expectations 
(on the y-axis) by current age of the respondent (on the x-axis). Age bins 60-61, 63-64, and 65 in 
Figures 2A and 2B are of particular interest, as a 2-year horizon from those ages implies the 
crossing of the early, normal, and full SS retirement ages (i.e., 62, 65, and 67), where actual 
labor supply displays well-known peaks. (Similarly, for age turns  59 , 60-61 & 62, and 63-64 at 
the 4 years horizon in Figure 2C.) 
In Figures 2A and 2B, the mean and median working expectations at 2 years feature sharp 
declines among the 60-61 years old (corresponding to the 62 peak), among the 63-64 years old 
(corresponding to the 65 peak), and among the 65 years old (corresponding to the 67 peak). 
Notice, however, that the mean and median working expectations do not decrease monotonically 
across groups of increasing age. This is consistent with increasing selectivity of the working and 
(high) health requirements applying to older respondents. An interesting additional feature of 
these age-specific distributions is that the cross-sectional variability of the subjective 
unconditional working expectations tends to increase with age, especially between respondents 
aged 62 or younger and respondents older than 62.  
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Moving to the 4-year-ahead horizon, inspection of Figure 2C reveals that the age-specific 
mean and median decrease sharply and steadily from the 59 and the 63-64 groups and level off 
(or tend to increase slightly) thereafter, again consistent with increasing selectivity of older sub-
groups. The cross-sectional variance of working expectations is now fairly high in all age groups 
and appears higher than the cross-sectional variance of the 2 years working expectations. This is 
consistent with a bigger role of heterogeneity as the forecasting horizon increases.  
Figures 3A-D show equivalent plots using the 2- and 4-year-ahead working probabilities 
given health. 
Law of Total Probability (LTP). Since we ask the probability of work given health, the
probability of health, and the unconditional probability of work, we are able to evaluate how well 
survey respondents obey the law of total probability in their responses. The respondents are quite 
good at applying the LTP.  Figure 4 gives plots of the reported unconditional probability of work 
versus that implied by the LTP for the 2-year horizon using box and whiskers plots for various 
bins.31 A large majority of the observations lies very close to the 45-degree line, corresponding 
to the case in which the self-reported probability and the calculated one are equal to each other. 
The correlation between the two measures is approximately 0.95. For those responses that 
deviate, the deviations are relatively small. Therefore, we conclude that overall respondents 
appear to understand the logic of probabilities.  This finding allows us to counter potential 
concerns that the probabilistic reasoning needed to answer the questions is too difficult for our 
respondents. 
The deviations from consistency of the LTP is most pronounced for respondents with self-
reported unconditional working probabilities equal to 0, 50, or 100 percent.  This finding is 
consistent with the suggestion in the literature that some respondents who give corner or 50/50 
responses are less good at probabilistic thinking. Note, however, that there are significant mass 
points of respondents who get it exactly right at 0 and 100.  Though not readily apparent because 
of the heaping at the corners, this vast majority of corner respondents are getting the LTP exactly 
right. 
IV. Empirical Analysis of SeaTE 
A. Distributions of Individual-Specific SeaTE 
31 The survey did not ask the unconditional probability of work for the 4-year horizon.
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How does working longer depend on health? What is the distribution of these causal effects of 
health on work for these workers? To answer these questions in Table 7 we report the sample 
distributions of the individual-level SeaTE for the 2-year horizon (column 1) and the 4-year 
horizon (column 2). Approximately 70% of the respondents gives a conditional subjective 
probability of working given low health which is strictly smaller than their subjective probability
of working if in high health regardless of the horizon (i.e., SeaTE < 0). The vast majority of the 
remaining respondents (28-29% depending on the horizon) gives the same probability of
working under the two health scenarios (implying a SeaTE = 0). Only a negligible fraction of 
respondents report a positive SeaTE. Note that a positive SeaTE is a theoretical possibility, e.g., 
if the value of leisure falls or need to work increases in low health. 
Conditional on a negative SeaTE (columns 3 and 4), the distribution of the (absolute values 
of the) SeaTE ranges between 2-4 percent and 100 percent regardless of the horizon, thus 
displaying substantial heterogeneity across respondents. The absolute values of both the median 
and mean SeaTE are somewhat higher in the 2-year horizon (40 and 41 percent) than in the 4-
year horizon (30 and 37 percent), possibly because a negative health shock is a stronger bite at 
younger ages than at older ages, when additional motivations for stopping working might kick in.       
B. Estimates of ASeaTE, ASeaTT, and ASeaTU 
Aggregating up the individual-level SeaTEs yields subjective ex ante versions of population 
parameters well-known in the treatment-effect literature. Specifically, similar to Arcidiacono et 
al. (2017) and Wiswall and Zafar (2016), we compute estimates of the average subjective ex ante
treatment effect (ASeaTE), the average subjective ex ante treatment effect on the treated 
(ASeaTT), and the average subjective ex ante treatment effect on the untreated (ASeaTU) using 
equation (1.9) The calculated values of the three parameters for the two horizons are shown in 
Table 8. 
ASeaTT and ASeaTU are very close to each other, providing little support for selection. That 
is, individuals who are more likely to experience low health in the future expect similar impacts 
of a negative health shock on their future work-retirement decisions to individuals who are less 
likely to enter low health. We return to this point is Section E where we simulate behavioral data 
based on our DP framework and elicited probabilities. 
C. Observed Heterogeneity and Predictors of SeaTE 
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In Table 9 we investigate whether the individual-level SeaTEs for the 2- and 4-year horizon vary 
by respondents’ characteristics. We report estimates from best linear predictions of 2- and 4-year 
ahead SeaTEs on the covariates listed in Table 1. The reference group corresponds to male 
respondents, aged 59 or younger, who have attained a high school diploma or a lower degree, 
currently working in their career job within the Management & Professional sector, who are not 
partnered, and who are in the highest quintile of the distributions of: total household wealth, 
current salary, and replacement rate.
At both horizons, the SeaTE tends to be larger (in absolute value) among older respondents, 
more educated respondents, partnered respondents, respondents with a working spouse, and 
respondents at lower quintiles of the household wealth, replacement rate, and salary 
distributions. The SeaTE tends to be smaller (in absolute value) among female respondents and 
respondents working in a bridge job or in lower-level sectors. These associations, however, are 
statistically significant only for respondent’s age and for selected quintiles of the replacement 
rate (in the 2-year case) and of the total household wealth (in the 4-year case). This suggests that 
most of the heterogeneity featured by respondents’ SeaTEs cannot be explained by heterogeneity 
in respondents’ observable characteristics. Hence, econometric approaches that use controls 
such these will still leave unobserved very substantial heterogeneity. 
D. Estimates using Dynamic Programming Framework 
We now proceed with analysis derived from the dynamic programming specification of Section 
II. The elicited conditional probabilities yield individual-level values of working versus not 
working given specified health. Hence, the approach introduced in this paper can deliver 
individual-level evidence on how the work/not-work choice shifts from high to low health. We 
now summarize what the survey responses imply about how the value of working versus not 
working shifts with health.  
Table 10 shows summary statistics for these values H and L from equation (1.27) for the 2-
year and 4-year-ahead conditional probabilities.32 As expected, the mean value in high health is 
substantially greater than that in low health reflecting the lower value of working in low health. 
The conditional probability of working is reflected in the last row of the table showing the 
32 Note for the purpose of the analysis in this paper, we are treating both the horizons as different “one-period 
ahead” expectations. That is, we are not modeling the transition from 2 to 4 year, but instead presenting them as 
separate (though obviously related) measurements. 
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fraction who expect to work in the specified health state. For the 4-year ahead horizon, there is a 
substantial shift down in the willingness to work in both the high-health and low-health states.  
Figure 5A shows a scatter plot of the values H and L for the 2-year horizon. Figure 5B 
shows an analogous plot for the 4-year horizon. These plots illustrate many features of the value 
of work conditional on health across respondents. In each of the two figures, the upper right 
quadrant contains the individuals who values work more than not work in both health states 
(where of course value is net of the residual uncertainty that will be realized at the time of the 
decision). The lower left quadrant has those who value work less in both states. The vast 
majority of individuals lie below the 45 degree line corresponding to having a lower value of
work relative to not work when in low health than in high health. It is not surprising that values 
shift in this direction. Lower health likely decreases taste for work and the return to work. Yet, 
shifting in the other direction is perfectly consistent with optimization. For those above the 45 
degree line, the relative attractiveness of work increases in low health. This valuation could 
result from need for insurance, lower value of leisure in low health, or need for income in low 
health. Indeed, there are a few observations in the upper left quadrant where the value of working 
is higher in low health than in high health. The opposite—in the lower right quadrant—is not 
surprisingly much more common. These represent the individual who would quit working after a 
negative health shock. 
There is a strong correlation between the value of work across the health states. A simple 
framework of summarizing is that there is a value of work in high health that is positively, but 
imperfectly correlated with that in low health.  Consider the model 
H H Hi  i (1.28) 
L L H L     ,i i i 
where  H  and  L  are the mean across individuals of the values and iH is the mean-zero 
heterogeneity across individuals in the value in the high health state. The heterogeneity in the 
low health states has two components: a component correlated with that in high health iH and 
an orthogonal component iL . 
Again, from the point of view of the respondent, these components are nonstochastic. Our 
procedure gives a direct measurement of the LHS of equation (1.28).  The orthogonal 
decomposition is a convenient way to summarize the observed heterogeneity.   
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Table 11 presents estimates of the parameters specified in equation (1.28).33  The estimates 
obtained are sensible. Consider first the estimates for the 2-year ahead horizon.
 The mean utility from work shifts substantially downward when health changes from 
high to low. The mean is 0.97 in high health and -1.04 in low health.
 The correlation within individual of the willingness to work across health states is fairly 
high, but far from unity. The coefficient   that controls this correlation is 0.71.  Hence, 
there is persistence within individuals of valuation of work across health states, implying 
that those with high value of work in high health carry that over into low health, but in a 
damped way.  
For the 4-year ahead horizon, there is a substantial shift down in the willingness to work in 
the high-health state—from 0.97 to 0.48.  In contrast, no shift in the willingness to work in the 
low-health state (-1.04 for both horizons). For interpreting these result, it is important to bear in 
mind that the estimate is based on a single cross section. The willingness to work declines 
sharply with age in the age range of the VRI sample, and this decrease is much greater in low 
health. The estimate of the coefficient  , controlling the correlation within individual of the 
willingness to work across health states, decrease slightly to 0.66. 
In Table 12, we incorporate covariates by modelling the mean utility from work as a linear 
index of respondents’ observable characteristics. In particular, we include all variables described
in Table 2 and used as predictors in Table 9.   
Inspection of these estimates reveals that the mean utility from work tends to decreases with 
age in both health states. Similarly, the mean utility from work also decreases with being 
partnered in both health states, but the estimated coefficient is strongly significant in high health 
and for the 2-year horizon only. 
On the other hand, the mean utility from work tends to increase with having a working 
spouse or partner, but the estimated coefficient is significant only in high health and for the 2-
year horizon. The mean utility from work also tends to increase across quantiles of the wealth 
distribution, but the estimated coefficients are significant in high health only. 
In this specification with covariates, the estimates of the coefficient  , controlling the 
correlation within individual of the willingness to work across health states, decrease slightly but 
are still substantial, 0.64 and 0.61 at 2 and 4 years respectively.   
33 These estimates are from an OLS regression where the first equation just has a constant and the second equation 
has a constant plus the residual from the first equation. Note that this is a random coefficient model, though we do
not have to specify a distribution since the values are observable.
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E. Relating Conditional Probabilities to Realizations using Dynamic Programming 
We can use the empirical results from the dynamic programming framework to illustrate the
benefit of having data on the heterogeneity of values as opposed to data on realized behavior. 
Consider the estimate of a linear regression model using data on working di and health hi 
realizations,
d b0 b h  1 i  e . (1.29) i    i 
As discussed in Section I, the least squares estimate of b1 will be an unbiased estimate of the 
ATE only when health is exogenous. In the terms of our dynamic programming model, 
exogeneity will fail when realized health is correlated across individuals with the values 
iH oriL . 
Our elicitation approach is designed to render this heterogeneity observable ex ante. 
Specifically, the average SeaTE defined in (1.8) will be an unbiased estimate the causal effect of 
health b1  even if there is heterogeneity which would be unobserved with conventional data on 
realizations of health and work. 
To demonstrate how biased estimates of causal effects can emerge in data on realizations, we 
use our framework to construct simulated realizations of work decisions and health states.  Using 
the dynamic programming model of Section II, equation (1.23) implies that the realized decision 
to work is 
i (1 h ) [ I iH      ] i [   iL  i ], (1.30) d   i i h I  
where I[.] is the indicator function, equal to 1 if the argument is positive and zero otherwise, and 
di 1if work and 0 otherwise. To simulate realizations that reflect the observed heterogeneity, 
we use the measured conditional value functions (iH oriL ) and simulated realizations of health 
(hi), and the residual component ( i ) to calculate simulated decisions according to equation 
(1.30). Health is modeled as (0,1), so it is simulated using Bernoulli draws based on the health 
transition probability  ih . Consistent with the implement of the DP formulation, i is simulated 
as standard normal. 
We consider three cases for correlation of the health transition probability  ih : 
1.  ih  is fixed at the sample mean, so health transitions are uncorrelated with the value 
of work. 
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2.  ih  is the individual-specific probabilities, so health transitions have the empirical 
correlation with the value of work. 
3.  ih  adjusts the individual-specific probabilities to induce an higher correlation 
between health and the value of work than is present in the VRI data .34 
The first case implies health is exogenous, so the OLS estimate of (1.29) will yield an unbiased 
estimate of the average treatment effect equal to the average SeaTE, The second case will 
illustrate the extent of the bias that would be present in the VRI data.  The third case magnifies 
the bias.35 
Table 13 shows estimates of the regression for simulated realization for the 2- and 4-year 
horizons simulated over 1000 replications for the three cases. The uncorrelated cases where the 
health transition probability is set to be equal to its mean are quasi-experimental, so the estimated 
coefficient of health is unbiased and therefore equals the average SeaTE shown in Tables 7 and 
8. 
The empirical cases yield a biased estimate because of the positive correlated heterogeneity 
in value of work and health transitions in the VRI. There is a slight, positive correlation between 
the value of work and the probability of being in high health. The sign of this correlation is not 
surprising because individuals in situations with attractive jobs (e.g., high SES) are also likely to 
have better health. The estimated coefficient of health is larger in absolute value than the causal 
effect because those who get bad health shocks disproportionately have lower value of work.  
The VRI respondents do not have that much heterogeneity in health (because most are quite 
healthy), so the magnitudes are small. Even so, the bias is nontrivial implying almost 10% more 
health-related job transitions than the causal effect.  
In other samples with more heterogeneity in health, this bias would be even more important 
as illustrated by the higher correlation case. 
Finally, recall that Table 12 shows that there is substantial heterogeneity in the values even 
after conditioning a rich set of covariates.  Therefore, conditioning on such covariates in 
h34 Specifically, the simulations are based on adjusting the   by subtracting 0.1 from individuals in the bottomi 
H Hquintile of  , subtracting 0.05 from those in the second quintile of  , leaving the middle quintile unadjusted, i i 
Hand adding 0.075 to the top two quintiles of  . (The top two quintiles are combined because they have a common i 
H corresponding to individual who gave a 100% change of working when in high health.) 
35 Note that this simulation is carried out under the assumption that unspecified states are ignorable.  See appendix
for discussion of deviations from this case. 
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econometric applications using data on realized decisions and states, though helpful, is not likely 
to eliminate bias from uncontrolled heterogeneity.  
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a novel strategy for assessing the causal effect of a negative health 
change on the labor supply of healthy older workers, based on individuals’ own estimates of their 
working probabilities at specified horizons under alternative scenarios about their future health. 
Since these effects are subjective and ex ante in nature, we have called them the Subjective ex 
ante Treatment Effect (SeaTE). 
Since these effects are obtained from respondents’ subjective probability of working if they 
enter low health minus their subjective probability of working if they remain in high health, they 
are individual-level effects. By aggregating these effects across individuals we have additionally 
derived estimates of population-level parameters, including the average SeaTE (ASeaTE) and 
the average subjective ex ante treatment effect on the treated and on the untreated (ASeaTT and 
ASeaTU respectively). 
We have shown the elicited probabilities can be interpreted in the standard dynamic 
programming framework for analyzing labor supply.  Transformations of the conditional 
probabilities of working given health equal the ex ante value of working versus not working 
given health. We use this framework to simulate realization of health and work given the survey 
responses that fully reflect the heterogeneity in preferences and expectations that go into the 
decision. There is correlation in the value of work and health that would be hard to disentangle in 
behavioral data when attempting to estimate the causal effect of health on retirement. The 
simulations show that the bias can be considerable.  
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Appendix.
Dynamic Programming Interpretation with Correlated Unspecified States 
We consider the interpretation of the conditional probabilities using the DP framework when 
there is a unspecified state y that is correlated with health.  This case is distinct from the residual 
uncertainty   that is additive in the value function and orthogonal to health.  Extending the case 
in Section IIC, suppose that the unspecified state is also binary.  To model correlation with 
H Hhealth, assume it can take on two values y , y  if health is high and potentially two different 
L Lvalues y , y if health is low. Let the probability of  y given health to be 
H H | H   P Y  
H H | H   1P Y   
L L | L   . P Y  
L L | L  1P Y   
Then equation (1.26) becomes
H H H H HP         1 i t, 1  it   it  
L L L LPL   it       1i t , 1      it  
where 
H H H   , ,W   v H Y  , ~ W v H Y   ,it it it 
H H H  , ,W  v H Y  , v H Y  , ~ W   it it it ,L L L it  ,W   v H Y  , W it ,  ~ v H Y  it , 
L L L   , ,W   v H Y  , ~ W v H Y   ,it it it 
that is, the differenced conditional value functions under the four possible combinations of health 
and the unspecified state.  Hence, the conditional probability of working given health Ph  is thei t, 1
weighted average of the conditional probability of working given health and the unspecified state 
h h  , with weights equal to the probabilities of the unspecified state give health it it 
h h ,  . 
Note explicitly mentioning a state does not necessarily cause the complication given above.  
For example, consider the leading case for studying health and retirement that has the wage a 
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function of health. If wage is the only state affecting retirement that is a function of health then 
the model in the main text applies.  In terms of the notation of the appendix, the probabilities of 
h hthe “unspecified” state give health  ,  are degenerate corners, so the expression above 
collapses to (1.26).   
The complication in interpretation discussed in the appendix would, however, arise if health 
shifts the utility function independent of wage (e.g., taste heterogeneity) and the probabilities 
h h ,   are not corners.  The conditional probability approach can still be used in this setting, 
but one would need to elicit the conditional probabilities of working fixing all combinations of 
health and wage.36 
36 An upcoming VRI survey pursues this approach.
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Figure 1. Treatments and Outcomes on a Simple Health-Work Decision Tree 
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Figure 2A. 2-Year Ahead Working Expectations by Age, Self-Reported 
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Figure 2B. 2-Year Ahead Working Expectations by Age, Calculated (LTP) 
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Figure 2C. 4-Year Ahead Working Expectations by Age, Calculated (LTP)
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Figure 3A. 2-Year Ahead Working Expectations in High Health by Age 
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Figure 3B. 2-Year Ahead Working Expectations in Low Health by Age 
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Figure 3C. 4-Year Ahead Working Expectations in High Health by Age 
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Figure 3D. 4-Year Ahead Working Expectations in Low Health by Age
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Figure 4.  Do Respondents Apply the Law of Total Probability?
Note: Figure shows the distribution of responses for the unconditional probability of working in 
2 years computed using the law of total probability (on the vertical axis) versus the self-reported 
reported unconditional probability of working in 2 years (on the horizontal axis).  
Figure 5. Measured Conditional Value Functions 
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Value in High Health H  
 
B. 4-Year Ahead 
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H L Note: Figures plots the measured differenced conditional value functions and for each 
respondent at 2- and 4-year horizons. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 1. Sample Selection 
Selection Stages Sample Size 
Total sample in Survey 4 3314 
Not eligible for the 2 years expectations battery 2249 
Career salary reported as 0 USD 9
Not in high health 29 
Inconsistent answer to 2 years expectations questions 57 
2 Years Sample 970 
Not eligible for the 4 years expectations battery 87 
Inconsistent answer to 4 years expectations questions 44 
4 Years Sample 839
 
 
   
 
   
   
  
  
  
   
  
   
   
    
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2. Sample Characteristics
2-Year Ahead 4-Year Ahead 
Characteristic Percent Percent 
Respondent’s age (at VRI Survey 4)
 59 22.9 24.4 
60-61 14 14.3 
62 6.7 7 
63-64 13.4 13.3 
65 4.9 4.2 
66-67 8.5 8.7 
68-69 8.6 8.2 
70-71 5.2 5.2 
 72 15.9 14.5 
Respondent’s gender 
   Female 37.01 36.83 
Male 62.99 63.17 
Respondent’s race/ethnicity 
Non-Hispanic white 94.74 94.87 
Asian 2.68 2.86 
Other 2.58 2.26 
Respondent’s marital status (at VRI S4)
   Partnered (married & share financial future) 65.5 64.8 
Not partnered 34.5 35.2 
Respondent’s educational attainment 
High school or less 5.77 5.96 
   Some college 14.95 13.83 
College graduate 38.97 38.38 
Other advanced degree 19.59 20.50 
MBA 7.94 8.46 
JD, PhD, MD 12.78 12.87 
Respondent’s health status (at VRI S4)
 High (excellent, very good, or good) 100 100 
Respondent’s employment status (at VRI S4)
   Working (full-time or part-time) 100 100 
Respondent’s job type (at VRI S4)
 Career 60.62 61.50 
Bridge 39.38 38.50 
Respondent’s occupation (at VRI S4)
   Management and professional 71.75 71.99 
Other services 17.32 17.04 
Operative 10.96 10.97 
Sample size 970 839 
 
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
   
 
  
    
    
   
 
  
Table 2 (Continued). Sample Characteristics 
2-Year Ahead 4-Year Ahead 
Characteristic Percent Percent 
Total household wealth in USD (at VRI S4)
 First quintile 0 – 258,475 0 – 255,584 
Second quintile 258,475 – 533,739 255,584 – 537,700 
Third quintile 533,739 – 874,867 537,700 – 877,000 
Fourth quintile 874,860 – 1,583,538 877,000 – 1,559,059 
Fifth quintile  1,583,538  1,559,059 
Replacement rate (Expected pension & SS; 
replacement rate, career job wage, at VRI S4)
 First quintile 0 – 24 0 – 24 
Second quintile 24 – 39 24 – 39 
Third quintile 39 – 58 39 – 58 
Fourth quintile 58 – 87 58 – 88 
Fifth quintile 87 + 88 + 
Respondent’s annual salary in USD (at VRI S4)
 First quintile 0 – 12,000 0 – 13,000 
Second quintile 12,000 – 45,714 13,000 – 47,000 
Third quintile 45,714 – 77,534 47,000 – 80,000 
Fourth quintile 77,534 – 117,000 80,000 – 120,000 
Fifth quintile  117,000  120,000 
Spouse’s age (at VRI S4)
 59 
60-61 
62 
63-64 
65 
66-67 
68-69 
70-71 
 72 
Sample size 
Spouse’s health status (at VRI S4)
 Excellent 
Very good 
Good 
Fair 
Poor 
   Sample size 
28.55 
15.11 
5.50 
11.91 
3.82 
7.48 
9.16 
4.58 
13.89 
635 
21.54 
44.40 
25.81 
6.87 
1.37 
635 
29.94 
15.90 
5.09 
12.19 
4.01 
6.94 
8.95 
4.48 
12.50 
544 
21.45 
44.75 
26.08 
6.79 
0.93 
544 
Spouse’s employment status (at VRI S4)
  Working (full-time or part-time) 48.85 49.07 
Not working 51.15 50.93 
  Sample size 635 544 
839Sample size 970 
 
 
 
   
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3. Partition of the Health States 
Health fill Health Health Health Health Health 
fill 1 fill 2 fill 3 fill 4 fill 5 
Self-rated (Health (Health (Working given (Working given (Working given 
health PC) PC) health PC) health PC) health PC) 
Excellent worse fair  excellent very good  fair
or poor or good or poor 
Very good worse fair very good good fair 
or poor or excellent or poor 
Good fair very good very good good fair 
(DK or RF) or poor or or excellent or poor 
excellent 
Fair about very good very good good fair 
the same or or excellent or poor 
or worse excellent 
Poor about  very good very good fair or good poor 
the same or or excellent 
or worse excellent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4. 2- and 4-Year Ahead Unconditional Working Expectations
Percent chance Percent chance Percent chance 
of working of working of working 
in 2 years in 2 years in 4 years 
(self-reported) (calculated) (calculated) 
Mean
Std. Dev. 
Q01 
Q05 
Q10 
Q25 
Median 
Q75 
Q90 
Q95 
Q99 
N of obs. 
% 0 
% in (0, 100) 
% 100 
69.8 
35.6 
0 
0 
5 
50 
90 
100 
100 
100 
100 
970 
9.48 
53.09 
37.42 
65.9 
35.3 
0 
0 
4.4 
40 
80.1 
97.5 
100 
100 
100 
970 
9.18 
73.51 
17.32 
52.7 
37 
0 
0 
0 
17 
50 
90 
100 
100 
100 
839 
11.68 
76.88 
11.44 
% 0 
% in (0, 50) 
% 50 
% in (50, 100) 
% 100 
9.48 
12.16 
11.96 
28.97 
37.42 
9.18 
21.86 
2.16 
49.48 
17.32 
11.68 
36 
2.5 
38.38 
11.44 
  
 
  
Table 5. 2-Year and 4-Year Ahead Health Expectations 
Percent chance Percent chance Percent chance Percent chance 
of high health of low health of high health of low health 
in 2 years in 2 years in 4 years in 4 years 
Mean 83.4 16.6 76.5 23.5 
Std. Dev. 16.5 16.5 19.5 19.5 
Q01 25 0 20 0 
Q05 50 0 40 0 
Q10 50 0 50 5 
Q25 75 5 70 10 
Median 90 10 80 20 
Q75 95 25 90 30 
Q90 100 50 95 50 
Q95 100 50 100 60 
Q99 100 75 100 90 
N of obs. 970 970 839 839 
% 0 0 13.61 0 6.56 
% in (0, 100) 86.39 86.39 93.44 93.44 
% 100 13.61 0 6.56 0 
% 0 0 13.61 0 6.56 
% in (0, 50) 1.75 75.15 6.67 74.37 
% 50 9.48 9.48 12.40 12.40 
% in (50, 100) 75.15 1.75 74.37 6.67 
% 100 13.61 0 6.56 0 
   
 
 
  
Table 6. 2- and 4-Year Ahead Working Expectations in High and in Low Health 
Percent chance Percent chance Percent chance Percent chance 
of working if  of working if  of working if  of working if  
in high health in low health in high health in low health 
in 2 years in 2 years in 4 years in 4 years 
Mean 70.5 41.9 58.7 33 
Std. Dev. 36 36.1 39 34.4 
Q01 0 0 0 0 
Q05 0 0 0 0 
Q10 5 0 0 0 
Q25 50 5 20 0 
Median 90 40 68 20 
Q75 100 75 100 50 
Q90 100 100 100 99 
Q95 100 100 100 100 
Q99 100 100 100 100 
N of obs. 970 970 839 839 
% 0 9.38 22.27 12.04 27.77 
% in (0, 100) 50.10 64.33 56.73 62.34 
% 100 40.52 13.40 31.23 9.89 
% 0 9.38 22.27 12.04 27.77 
% in (0, 50) 13.81 28.97 25.03 35.76 
% 50 9.48 17.73 9.89 13.11 
% in (50, 100) 26.80 17.63 21.81 13.47 
% 100 40.52 13.40 31.23 9.89 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
Table 7. 2- and 4-Year Ahead Subjective ex ante Treatment Effects (SeaTE) of Health on Work 
2-Year 4 Year 2 Year 4 Year 
SeaTE SeaTE SeaTE SeaTE 
(if SeaTE < 0) (if SeaTE < 0) 
Mean -28.5 -25.7 -40.9 -36.8 
Std. Dev. 27.9 27.6 24.1 25.1 
Q01 -100 -100 -100 -100 
Q05 -80 -80 -90 -85 
Q10 -70 -70 -75 -75 
Q25 -50 -50 -50 -50 
Median -25 -20 -40 -30 
Q75 0 0 -20 -15 
Q90 0 0 -10 -10 
Q95 0 0 -9.4 -5 
Q99 5 0 -4.3 -2 
N of obs. 970 839 682 594 
% STE = -100 1.55 1.43 
% STE in (-100, 0) 68.76 69.37 
% STE = 0 28.45 28.25 
% STE > 0 1.24 0.95 
% STE = -100 1.55 1.43 
% STE in (-100, -50) 14.74 12.75 
% STE = 50 14.43 11.32 
% STE in (-50, 0) 39.59 45.29 
% STE = 0 28.45 28.25 
% STE > 0 1.24 0.95 
Note: SeaTE = probability of working if in low health – probability of working if in high health. 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 8. 2- and 4-Year Ahead Average Subjective ex ante Treatment Effects 
Horizon 2 Years 4 Years 
Aggregate TE parameter 
ASeaTE -28.5 -25.7 
ASeaTT -27.4 -25.2 
ASeaTU -28.8 -25.8 
Sample Size 970 839 
Note: ASeaTE is the average Subjective ex ante Treatment Effect; ASeaTT is the average 
Subjective ex ante Treatment Effect on the Treated; ASeaTU is the average Subjective ex ante
Treatment Effect on the Untreated. All three are defined in equation (1.8).  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
   
   
  
Table 9. Predictors of 2- and 4-Year Ahead SeaTE
2-Year Ahead 4-Year Ahead 
Predictors SeaTE SeaTE 
Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE)
Constant -0.150** -0.116* 
(0.061) (0.065) 
R’s age 
age in 60-61 -0.046 -0.038 
(0.031) (0.032) 
age = 62 -0.117*** -0.055 
(0.040) (0.041) 
age in 63-64 -0.034 -0.034 
(0.031) (0.033) 
age = 65 -0.031 -0.111** 
(0.045) (0.051) 
age in 66-67 -0.021 0.028 
(0.037) (0.039) 
age in 68-69 -0.120*** -0.081** 
(0.037) (0.040) 
age in 70-71 -0.116** -0.088* 
(0.046) (0.049) 
age  72 -0.088** -0.086** 
(0.034) (0.037) 
R’s gender 
female 0.001 -0.012 
(0.021) (0.023) 
R’s education 
some college 
college grad
other adv. degree 
MBA 
-0.002 
(0.044) 
0.006 
(0.042) 
-0.042 
(0.045) 
-0.014 
-0.025 
(0.047) 
-0.010 
(0.044) 
-0.019 
(0.047) 
0.003 
JD, PhD, MD 
(0.051) 
-0.031 
(0.054) 
-0.076 
(0.050) (0.053) 
R’s occupation 
operative 
other services 
0.008 
(0.025) 
-0.020 
-0.008 
(0.027) 
-0.020 
(0.032) (0.034) 
R’s job type
bridge 0.008 
(0.022) 
-0.015 
(0.023) 
R’s marital status
partnered -0.012 
(0.024) 
-0.010 
(0.026) 
Spouse’s work status 
working -0.014 
(0.023) 
-0.003 
(0.025) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
Total HH wealth
1st quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
R’s replacement rate 
1st quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile
R’s current salary
1st quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile
-0.039 
(0.033) 
-0.045 
(0.032) 
-0.020 
(0.030) 
-0.044 
(0.029) 
-0.013 
(0.031) 
0.002 
(0.031) 
-0.023 
(0.030) 
-0.018 
(0.030) 
-0.039 
(0.037) 
-0.067** 
(0.034) 
-0.0001 
(0.032) 
-0.005 
(0.030) 
-0.039 
(0.036) 
-0.084** 
(0.034) 
-0.032 
(0.032) 
-0.044 
(0.031) 
-0.022 
(0.033) 
0.028 
(0.033) 
-0.023 
(0.032) 
-0.018 
(0.032) 
-0.032 
(0.039) 
-0.040 
(0.036) 
0.008 
(0.034) 
-0.003 
(0.031) 
Sample size 970 839 
R2 0.0484 0.0528 
Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Table 10. DP Values in High and Low Health 
2-year Ahead 4-year Ahead 
H L H L 
Mean
Standard deviation 
Q01 
Q10 
Q25 
Median 
Q75 
Q90 
Q99 
0.97 
1.70 
-2.58 
-1.64 
0 
1.28 
2.58 
2.58 
2.58 
-0.35 
1.65 
-2.58 
-2.58 
-1.64 
-0.25 
0.67 
2.58 
2.58 
0.48 
1.80 
-2.58 
-2.58 
-0.84 
0.47 
2.58 
2.58 
2.58 
-0.72 
1.60 
-2.58 
-2.58 
-2.58 
-0.84 
2.33 
2.58 
% > 0 67.32 31.03 53.04 23.36 
Sample Size 970 970 839 839 
Notes: Table shows distribution of the measured differenced conditional value functions 
H and L .
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
Table 11. Quantifying Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity in DP Values
Horizon 2-year Ahead 4-year Ahead 
Health state h=H h=L h=H h=L 
0.97*** -1.04*** 0.48*** -1.04*** h (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) 
0.71*** 0.66*** (0.02) (0.02) 
 ( ) h 1.70 1.12 1.80 1.06 
Sample Size 970 970 839 839 
Notes: Table shows mean, covariance, and variability of the measured differenced conditional 
value functions H and L as specified in equation (1.28) of text. *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
    
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12. Quantifying Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity in DP Values, With Covariates 
Horizon 2-year Ahead 4-year Ahead 
Health state h=H h=L h=H h=L 
Constant 1.34*** -0.39 0.43 -0.44* 
(0.35) (0.24) (0.40) (0.24) 
R’s age 
age in 60-61 -0.41** -0.34*** -0.47** -0.32*** 
(0.17) (0.12) (0.20) (0.12) 
age = 62 -0.18 -0.51*** -0.99*** -0.48*** 
(0.22) (0.16) (0.25) (0.16) 
age in 63-64 -1.08*** -0.46*** -1.23*** -0.61*** 
(0.18) (0.13) (0.20) (0.13) 
age = 65 -1.43*** -0.57*** -1.01*** -0.79*** 
(0.25) (0.18) (0.31) (0.19) 
age in 66-67 -1.07*** -0.34** -1.54*** -0.41*** 
(0.21) (0.15) (0.24) (0.15) 
age in 68-69 -1.22*** -0.86*** -1.36*** -0.77*** 
(0.21) (0.15) (0.24) (0.15) 
age in 70-71 -1.15*** 0.72*** -1.16*** -0.74*** 
(0.26) (0.18) (0.30) (0.18) 
age  72 -1.03*** -0.71*** -1.01*** -0.72*** 
(0.19) (0.14) (0.23) (0.14) 
R’s gender 
female -0.09 -0.04 0.03 -0.08 
(0.12) (0.08) (0.14) (0.08) 
R’s education 
some college 
college grad
other adv. degree 
MBA 
-0.16 
(0.25) 
-0.08 
(0.24) 
0.15 
(0.25) 
0.13 
-0.16 
(0.17) 
-0.03 
(0.16) 
-0.13 
(0.18) 
-0.06 
0.13 
(0.29) 
0.07 
(0.27) 
0.15 
(0.29) 
0.16 
-0.08 
(0.18) 
-0.01 
(0.16) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
0.01 
JD, PhD, MD 
(0.29) 
0.18 
(0.20) 
-0.09 
(0.33) 
0.55 
(0.20) 
-0.19 
(0.28) (0.20) (0.32) (0.20) 
R’s occupation 
operative 0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.01 
(0.14) (0.10) (0.17) (0.10) 
other services 0.11 0.05 0.12 -0.00 
(0.18) (0.13) (0.21) (0.13) 
R’s job type
bridge -0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.08 
(0.12) (0.09) (0.14) (0.09) 
R’s marital status
partnered -0.35*** -0.14 -0.16 -0.16* 
(0.13) (0.09) (0.16) (0.10) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Spouse’s work status 0.36*** 0.03 0.02 0.04 
working (0.13) (0.09) (0.15) (0.09) 
Total HH wealth
1st quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile 
R’s replacement rate 
1st quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile
0.92*** 0.19 1.02*** 0.16 
(0.19) (0.13) (0.22) (0.14) 
0.68*** 0.01 1.01*** -0.09 
(0.18) (0.12) (0.21) (0.13) 
0.40** 0.02 0.39** -0.04 
(0.17) (0.12) (0.20) (0.12) 
0.24 -0.02 0.28 -0.10 
(0.16) (0.12) (0.19) (0.12) 
0.24 0.10 0.47** 0.14 
(0.18) (0.12) (0.20) (0.12) 
0.29* 0.09 0.09 0.22* 
(0.17) (0.12) (0.20) (0.12) 
0.19 0.008 0.09 -0.00 
(0.17) (0.12) (0.20) (0.12) 
-0.05 -0.14 -0.11 -0.01 
(0.17) (0.12) (0.20) (0.12) 
R’s current salary
1st quintile 
2nd quintile 
3rd quintile 
4th quintile
-0.49** -0.20 -0.07 -0.11 
(0.21) (0.14) (0.24) (0.15) 
0.22 -0.11 0.33 0.00 
(0.19) (0.13) (0.22) (0.13) 
-0.06 0.02 0.09 0.09 
(0.18) (0.12) (0.21) (0.12) 
-0.19 0.01 -0.12 -0.04 
(0.17) (0.12) (0.19) (0.12) 
0.64*** 0.61*** (0.02) (0.02) 
( ) 1.56 1.09 1.67 1.02  h 
Sample Size 970 970 839 839 
R2 0.19 0.58 0.16 0.61 
Notes: Table shows mean as a linear index of covariates, covariance, and variability of the 
measured differenced conditional value functions H and L as specified in equation (1.28) of 
text. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
     
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Relationship between Health and Work with Simulated Realizations
Horizon 2-year Ahead 4-year Ahead 
Higher HigherCase Uncorrelated Empirical Uncorrelated Empiricalcorrelation correlation 
Constant 0.703 0.709 0.730 0.586 0.594 0.621 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.014) (0.018) 
Health h -0.282 -0.305 -0.415 -0.254 -0.286 -0.371 
(0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.035) (0.039) 
SEE 0.463 0.461 0.448 0.488 0.485 0.474 
Sample 
size
970 970 970 839 839 839 
Note: Table reports mean values from the 1000 replications. Uncorrelated case has health 
transition probability fixed at mean; empirical case uses individual-specific elicited health 
transition probabilities. Highly correlated case has stronger correlation of health transition 
probability and value of work as described in text. The LHS variable is the simulated realized 
decision to work (d). The RHS variable is simulated realized health state (h). 
